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Abstract
This paper provides a detailed summary and analysis of “Slicing Off the Tu-
mour,” a text written by two sons of Muhammad Yusuf (d. 2009), founder of the 
Nigerian Jihadi movement known as “Boko Haram,” and recently (2018) pub-
lished by the Islamic State. The paper argues that although obviously biased, 
this book provides important insights into the history of Jihad in Nigeria as seen 
through the lenses of Global Jihadi actors, which the analysts should not dis-
miss. In the conclusion, the author questions the heuristic usefulness of the term 
“Boko Haram” in the literature on local and global manifestations of Jihad in con-
temporary Nigeria. Finally, the author locates his position in the recent debate 
around the nature of the global links entertained by Nigerian Jihadi actors and 
around the role of these links in the development of the “Boko Haram phenom-
enon.”
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Introduction
The links between Boko Haram and global Jihadi actors have been recently 
the object of a hot debate in the academic literature on the topic.2 In a recent 
article, Alessio Iocchi and I have analysed a document (“Some Advice and Guide-
lines”) published by Al-Qaeda in 2017.3 This document—which has been also, 
1  Andrea Brigaglia, (PhD) is the director of the Centre for Contemporary Islam (CCI), University of Cape Town, and a Senior Lecturer 
in the Department of Religious Studies, University of Cape Town. He has recently co-edited (with Mauro Nobili) a book on The Arts 
and Crafts of Literacy: Islamic Manuscript Cultures in Sub-Saharan Africa (De Gruyter, Berlin, 2017), and he has published many ar-
ticles on Sufi literature, Quranic calligraphy and Quranic exegesis in Nigeria, as well as on the intellectual roots of the Boko Haram 
phenomenon. E-mail: andrea.brigaglia@uct.ac.za
2  For the argument that these links were not decisive in the history of the Nigerian movement, see especially Higazi Adam, Kend-
hammer Brandon, Mohammed Kyari, Pérouse de Montclos Marc-Antoine, and Thurston Alex, A Response to Jacob Zenn on Boko 
Haram and al-Qa‘ida, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2018, pp. 203-213. For a response, see Zenn Jacob, A Primer on 
Boko Haram Sources and Three Heuristics on al-Qaida and Boko Haram in Response to Adam Higazi, Brandon Kendhammer, Kyari 
Mohammed, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, and Alex Thurston, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2018, pp. 74-91.
3  Brigaglia Andrea and Iocchi Alessio, ‘Some Advice and Guidelines’: The History of Global Jihad in Nigeria, as Narrated by the 
© 2018 Authors. Center for Study of Religion and Religious Tolerance, Belgrade, Serbia.This article is an open access article
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though only partly, used in Alexander Thurston’s recent book on Boko Haram4–
provides rich insights into the history of Jihad in Nigeria as seen through the eyes 
of a global Jihadi group. The main information provided in “Some Advice and 
Guidelines” can be summarised in the following points:
(1) The first contacts between a group of Nigerians and a Global Jihadi 
organisation date back to the mid-1990s, when some Nigerians started to train 
within the ranks of the Saharan branch of GSPC (Salafi Group for Preaching and 
Combat), which would later become Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
(2) While ideologically inspired by Al-Qaeda, and while including AQIM-
linked members in his group, in the mid-2000s the first leader of “Boko Haram” 
Muhammad Yusuf operated independently from AQIM.
(3) Immediately after the Nigerian government’s crackdown on Muhamad 
Yusuf and his network (July-August 2009), members of the Nigerian AQIM-
linked cell travelled to the Sahara to reorganise themselves in co-ordination 
with their North African partners.
(4) AQIM provided intense military training and occasional financial help to 
their new Nigerian franchise during the years 2010-2011.
(5) AQIM, however, was not interested in opening a new front of Jihad 
against the Nigerian government: its strategy in Nigeria was focus its attacks on 
western targets and Christian missions. 
(6) AQIM did not want to push the theology of takfīr (excommunication 
of other Muslims) too far: its strategy was to adopt a soft propaganda aimed at 
gradually drawing the Nigerian Muslim community to the cause of Jihad, while 
carefully avoiding the targeting of (Muslim) civilians and the hasty excommuni-
cation of the Muslim masses, even if those were hesitant to collaborate with the 
Jihadi project.
(7) Abubakar Shekau was originally recognised by AQIM as the legitimate 
successor to Muhammad Yusuf and as the new leader of the Nigerian Jihadi 
community. However, due to his theological extremism and to his targeting of 
other Muslims (including elders and commanders of the Jihadi organisation who 
were reluctant to follow his leadership), he was rejected as soon as late 2011. 
AQIM’s rejection of Shekau on theological grounds was argued in several treatis-
es, penned both by Nigerian (Abū Muslim al-Ibrāhīmī) and international theolo-
gians (‘Abdallāh al-Shinqīṭī and Abū al-Ḥasan al-Bulaydī) aligned with Al-Qaeda.
(8) Shekau’s behaviour was seen by AQIM as the systematic undoing of the 
work of Al-Qaeda in the country: Shekau’s operations were targeting Muslim 
Islamic State, Annual Review of Islam in Africa, Vol. 14, 2017, pp. 27-35. For the full text of the book, see Al-Bulaydī Abū al-
Ḥasan al-Rashīd, Naṣā’iḥ wa-Tawjīhāt Shar‘iyya li-Mujāhidī Nayjīriyā, edited by Abū Nu‘mān Qutayba al-
Shinqīṭī, Mu’assasat al-Andalus, 2017 (https://jihadology.net/2017/04/28/new-release-from-the-archives-of-al-qaidah-in-
the-islamic-maghribs-shaykh-abu-al-%E1%B8%A5%asan-rashid-shariah-advice-and-guidance-for-the-mujahidin-of-Nigeria/, 
accessed 1.8.2018)
4  Thurston Alexander, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement, Oxford University Press, Oxford and Princeton, 2018, 
especially pp. 160-179.
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commoners instead of focusing on western or Christian objectives; he was alien-
ating the older leadership of the group and even killing, one after the other, its 
most influential commanders and scholars; and he was unveiling the secrets of 
the organisation to the Nigerian security through his public messages, facilitat-
ing the arrest of some of the commanders and the prevention of some of the 
planned attacks.
(9) The creation of a new Jihadi group (Ansaru) independent of Shekau’s 
and aligned to Al-Qaeda, was the outcome of the above process.
Earlier this year (2018), the Islamic State has issued a similar publication, en-
titled Khadh‘ al-waram min al-khawārij al-Shīkawiyya bi-bay‘at ahl al-karam (Slic-
ing off the Tumour of Shekau’s Kharijites, in Pledging Allegiance to the Honour-
able Ones).5 Similarly to “Some Advice and Guidelines,” “Slicing off the Tumour” 
offers a wealth of interesting insights into the history of Jihad in contemporary 
Nigeria, as seen through the eyes of global Jihadi actors—in this case actually Ni-
gerians, but recognised as legitimate interlocutors by the Islamic State. This text 
has been discussed in two recent posts by Alexander Thurston.6 In the following 
lines, I will summarise the text more in detail for the benefit of the English-lan-
guage readers and, in the conclusive reflections, I will try to locate my position 
in the recent debate around whether the emergence of Boko Haram should be 
seen primarily as the result of structural problems inherent in the local Nigerian 
context, or of the agency of global Jihadi actors.
“Slicing off the Tumour” is a 120-page treatise. In the cover page, the book is 
credited to “two sons of the Shaykh Abī Yūsuf al-Barnāwī,” that is, of Muhammad 
Yusuf. The book, however, is mostly written in the singular first person and is 
most certainly to be credited to Abū Muṣ‘ab al-Barnāwī, the current official lead-
er of the West Africa Province of the Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya – Wilāyat 
Gharb Ifrīqiyā). Like “Some Advice and  Guidelines,” “Slicing off the Tumour” 
is framed as representing the point of view of an orthodox stream in Salafi-Ji-
hadi thought7 and as rejecting the “extremism” (ghuluww) and the “deviation” 
(inḥirāf) of the misled (ḍāll) community of “Kharijites” led by Shekau. Emerged in 
the seventh century and characterised by a rigorist theology, the Kharijites were 
5  Ibnā al-Shaykh Abī Yūsuf al-Barnāwī, Khadh‘ al-waram min al-khawārij al-Shīkawiyya bi-bay‘at ahl al-karam, al-Ḥaqā’iq, 
Dawlat al-Khilāfa al-Islāmiyya, 2018.
6  Thurston Alexander, Boko Haram/Islamic State West Africa’s New History of Itself, Part 1, https://sahelblog.wordpress.
com/2018/07/23/boko-haram-islamic-state-westafricas-new-history-of-itself-part-1/ (accessed 1.8.2018); Thurston Alexander, 
Boko Haram/ Islamic State West Africa’s New History of Itself, Part 2, https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2018/07/23/bokoharam-
islamic-state-west-africas-new-history-of-itselfpart-2/ (accessed 1.8.2018).
7  Salafism is a Sunni theological strand that is mainly represented today by the Wahhābi School of Saudi Arabia. It is characterised 
by a desire to return to the practices of the early generations of Muslims (the Salaf) and by its rejection of Shiism, Sufism and 
classical Sunni theological thought, which are represented as accretions or deviations from the practices of the Salaf (see Lauzière 
Henri, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century, Columbia University Press, New York, 2015). Global Jihadi 
movements like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State, stem from the Salafi movement but reject the political quietism en-
joined by the official scholars of Saudi Arabia. For a historical reconstruction of the development of Jihadi-Salafism as a relatively 
independent stream in Islamic thought, see Maher Shiraz, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea, Penguin Books, London, 2015.
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the first religious group to stem off the mainstream Muslim community. Today, 
the label of “Kharijite” is loosely applied by Muslims to any group that allegedly 
manifests extremism or rejects “legitimate” authority. Thus, mainstream Sunnis 
often use this label for the Salafis as a whole; mainstream Salafis apply it to the 
Jihadi; and Jihadis like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State apply it to Boko Haram’s 
leader Shekau.
“Slicing off the Tumour” is a book written in a nuanced Arabic, interspersed 
with metaphors, learned references and quotes from classical Arabic poetry, and 
it is organised in five chapters. The first provides a history of the Jihadi move-
ment in Nigeria from its inception to today, with an interesting section dedi-
cated to the biography of Yusuf (coincidentally, pp. 9-11) and a less interesting 
one on the biography of Shekau (pp. 35-36). The central and longest chapter 
(Two) is devoted to a detailed theological examination of the doctrines of the 
Kharijites from the point of view of Sunni theology, as well as to an examination 
of Shekau’s doctrines aimed at demonstrating that he falls into that category. 
Chapter Three summarises the “fruits” of Shekau’s doctrines in the Nigerian Ji-
hadi landscape. Finally, Chapter Four, in providing theological justification for 
fighting the Kharijites as drawn from classical Islamic literature, serves to prove 
the necessity of a military engagement, by the Jihadi forces aligned with the 
Islamic State, against Shekau’s group. As the most important information, from 
the historical point of view, is provided in chapters One, Three and Four, the re-
construction below will be focused on them.
Muhammad Yusuf, the Mujaddid
Though framed in a hagiographical style, the first chapter provides some 
interesting information on the life of the father of the author(s), Muḥammad b. 
Yūsuf b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad, al-Dāghirī (a nisba or toponym that refers to the 
origins of his mother in Girgir, Jakusko local government, Yobe State). The out-
line of his life provided in this text does not differ much from the one available 
in most published sources on Boko Haram but is somewhat richer in detail. Mu-
hammad Yusuf, described as a mujaddid (reviver of Islam) in multiple instances 
in the text, was born in Jakusko and grew in a Sufi background. He moved to 
Maiduguri in search of Islamic knowledge, and there, he studied the Quran, fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence), Arabic language and elementary hadith at the hands of 
the scholars of the local zawāyā (Sufi circles). He then enrolled in the al-Kanemi 
Institute, located in the neighbourhood of Borno Express (Maiduguri), where he 
received a more formal Islamic training (p. 9).
In search of a more activist form of Islamic engagement than the one of-
fered by the traditional scholars of the Sufi orders, at some point Yusuf joined 
the “Muslim Brothers,” a group led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and known as the van-
guard of the Islamist opposition to the military governments of Ibrahim Baba-
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ngida (1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998). As many other conservative 
Sunnis, however, Yusuf left the movement in 1994, when El-Zakzaky publicly an-
nounced his inclination towards Shiism.8 He then joined the Salafi movement of 
Izala.9 Yusuf—continue the authors—quickly rose to prominence in the ranks of 
Izala, until he “occupied a highly regarded position and enjoined good reputa-
tion with all of them” (p. 10). Then, in 2002 he broke off from the Izala-aligned 
Salafis, “without, however, fighting them or claiming complete independence 
from them, but showing kindness to them and inviting them to stop associating 
(al-muwālāt) and participating (al-dukhūl) into a democratic government, for the 
latter is more contagious than scabies” (p. 10). 
The 9/11 attacks were, for the authors, a turning point in Yusuf’s life (p. 11), 
for they divided the world into two umbrella groups (fusṭaṭān) to which “no third 
can be” (lā thālitha lahumā):
(1) the umbrella of “faith without hypocrisy,” i.e. the Muslims who em-
braced Global Jihad by either “migrating to the land of Jihad or remaining in 
their lands trying to ignite the fire of Jihad there”; and
(2) the umbrella of “unbelief without hypocrisy,” i.e. the “Jews, the Crusad-
ers” and all those, in the Muslim world, who opposed the Global Jihad of Al-
Qaeda.
On 9/11, 2001, Yusuf was in Saudi Arabia observing the Pilgrimage rituals. 
As a consequence of the news of the attack, “what had been previously dormant 
in his soul, was awakened,” “his heart was brought back to life and an exemplary 
path was drafted for him,”10 so that he could finally see in Jihad, and in Jihad only, 
the right solution to the injustices suffered by Muslims the world over. Jihad was 
seen by Yusuf, in particular, as the right response to the incapacity of the various 
Nigerian governments to respond to the inter-religious crises of the Middle Belt 
(Kafanchan, Zangon Kataf, Kaduna, Tafawa Balewa, Plateau State) and the South 
(Shagamu), where Muslims had been victimised by Christian or ethnic militias, 
often with the complicity of the Nigerian military." Because of their closeness to 
the Nigerian government— the authors continue to argue—the “Murjiites of 
8  1994 is the year in which, in reaction to El-Zakzaky’s Shiism, a group of Sunni dissidents of the Muslim Brothers defected and 
established a new organisation, Jamā‘at Tajdīd al-Islām (JTI), under the leadership of Abubakar Mujahid (see Isa Kabiru H, Adam 
Sani Y, A History of Shia and its Development in Nigeria: The Case-Study of Kano, Journal for Islamic Studies, Vol. 37, 2017, pp, 
226-256, especially pp. 234-236. In some cases, membership in the JTI overlapped with membership in the Salafi organisation of 
Izala, but at their core, the first was always more political in orientation, and the second more theological. It is not clear whether 
Yusuf was ever affiliated with the JTI.
9  On the history of Izala, see Ben Amara Ramzi, The Development of the Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis 
and Perception of Sharī‘a Implementation, PhD Thesis, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, 2011, available online at: https://epub.
unibayreuth.de/101/1/BenAmaraDiss.pdf (accessed 1.8.2018). On the broader history of the Salafi trend in Nigeria, see Thurston 
Alexander, Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016.
10  The language used by the authors here suggestively reminds one of William James’ classical psychology of religion, where reli-
gious conversion is defined as a process whereby a subject’s “religious ideas, previously peripheral in his consciousness, now take 
a central place, and […] religious aims form the habitual center of his energy (James William, The Varieties of Religious Experience: 
A Study in Human Nature, Collier, New York, 1902, pp. 200-201). In this sense, one could argue that, if the account of the authors 
of “Slicing off the Tumour” is accurate, the events of 9/11 triggered Yusuf’s conversion to Jihadi-Salafism.
204 ИЗМЕЂУ ФЕНОМЕНА И ПОКРЕТА: БОКО ХАРАМ, ЏИХАДИСТИЧКИ ПОБУЊЕНИЦИ У НИГЕРИЈИ 21. ВЕКА
ПОЛИТИКОЛОГИЈА РЕЛИГИЈЕ бр. 2/2018 год XII• POLITICS AND RELIGION • POLITOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS • Nº 2/2018 Vol. XII
today, the scholars of the Sultans” (references to the Izala-aligned Salafis, drawn 
from the Saudi Islamist literature, where the terms are applied to the scholars 
who support the Kingdom), were unable to offer an adequate response to 
the predicament of the Nigerian Muslims.
Although the Jihadi positions of Yusuf had been clear, “in his sermons and 
preaches” (p. 12), since the year 1422 (2001-2002), it was not until the year 1424 
(2003), when he openly preached “for monotheism and Jihad, and for a com-
plete disavowal of the followers of democracy and of its demonic ‘ulamā’,” that 
the latter (again, obviously a reference to Izala) withdrew from him. The reference 
to the year 2003, and to the fact that this is the time when the core Salafi leader-
ship of Nigeria took a distance from Yusuf, is important to take note of. In a 2015 
article,11 I had argued that the decision of the Nigerian Salafi leadership to col-
laborate with the security in dismantling a first Jihadi camp in Kanamma (which 
most of the literature had previously referred to as a pacific “Salafi commune”), 
was the event that had precipitated the split between the Jihadi-Salafis and their 
non-Jihadi counterparts. In the same paper, I also argued that the split between 
Yusuf and the “mainstream Salafis” was a result of the fact that the latter, after 
some initial hesitation, had decided to take a stand against the Global Jihad of 
Al-Qaeda—and not of the progressive radicalisation of the former. Izala’s rejec-
tion of Jihad—I was convinced then, and I am even more convinced today—was 
the result of the pressure created by the new context of the global War on Ter-
ror, and in particular, of a Saudi attempt to force the various Salafi constituen-
cies around the world, in which multiple trends overlapped, and over which the 
Saudi government exerted varying degrees of control, to position themselves in 
a clearer way. The authors of “Slicing off the Tumour” will have more to say on 
Kanamma in a subsequent section.
By that time, Yusuf— the text continues—was already “inciting against 
the ṭawāghīṭ (i.e, the political representatives of Nigeria’s constitutional dispen-
sation) and calling away from the foreign schools and the democratic system, 
while spurring to Jihad and quickening the pace to ingathering the vanguard of 
the believers (anṣār) and putting the Monotheists back on their feet” (p. 13). Ac-
cording to this book, then, Yusuf was not a pacific preacher who would suddenly 
turn violent in 2009, but, as suggested by several recent contributions on Boko 
Haram,12 by the early 2000s he had already deeply invested on the promotion 
of a form of Jihadi project ideologically inspired (but not necessarily externally 
directed) by Al-Qaeda.
The chapter continues by providing more information on the content of 
Yusuf’s call. The main aspect of his preaching was that democracy constitutes a 
11  Brigaglia Andrea, The Volatility of Salafi Political Theology, the War on Terror and the Genesis of Boko Haram, Diritto & Questioni 
Pubbliche, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2015, pp. 175-201.
12  See especially Kassim Abdulbasit, Nwankpa Michael, The Boko Haram Reader: From Nigerian Preachers to the Islamic State, Hurst, 
London, 2018.
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form of shirk (polytheism), for it implies allegiance to a legislating subject other 
than God; in this case, the parliament of a country (p. 14). Although on this point 
of doctrine, he was supported by a wealth of fatwas (religious edicts) emanating 
from the Quietist Salafi scholars of Saudi Arabia (from Bin Baz and al-Albānī 
to, more recently, Rabī‘ al-Madkhalī and Muqbi b. Hādī al-Wādi‘ī),13 Yusuf, con-
trary to these Quietist scholars, was not calling Muslims to passively withdraw 
from their political environment and to refrain from running for, or voting in, the 
democratic elections of a kufr (un-Islamic) system like the Nigerian government: 
his call, in fact, “was not a call to preaching, although preaching was a part of it; 
it was not a call to education, although education was a prerequisite to it; and it 
was not a call to teaching, although teaching was one of its conditions.” His was, 
continue the authors of “Slicing off the Tumour,” quoting from one of Yusuf’s 
lectures, “a call to Jihad, and anyone who considers it as a call to preaching or 
education or teaching, or a call without essence, has not understood this call: for 
this is a Jihadi call and a Jihadi movement; a community of fighters, and not a 
community of preachers only.”14
After becoming independent from Izala, Yusuf, the authors continue, was 
able to establish a number of centers for his mission in a variety of northern Nige-
rian states, including Bauchi, Kano and Gombe. Borno State, however, remained, 
as is well known, his central base of operation, and most of the establishments 
where he was directly engaged in teaching were located in Maiduguri, the state 
capital: the Ibn Taymiyya Center (where he delivered his Friday sermons and 
where he taught Quranic exegesis, Hadith and Life of the Prophet on Saturdays 
and Sundays); the Ṭā’ifat al-Manṣūra Mosque (where he taught weekly sessions 
of Quranic exegesis on Fridays); a centre in the Millionaires’ Quarters (where he 
taught weekly sessions of Quranic exegesis on Fridays, in Kanuri), the Fezzan 
Mosque (where he occasionally delivered lectures); a centre in the neighbour-
hood of Lawan Bor (where he taught the Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn of al-Nawawī, in Ka-
nuri); the Abū Hurayra Mosque (where he delivered special sessions on the “pu-
rification of the soul,” tazkiyat al-nafs). Yusuf did not give a specific name to his 
organisation, but created a community of followers who were integrated in the 
broader Muslim environment, from which they were distinguished only by their 
stricter adherence to the outward aspects of the Sunna (full face-veil for women; 
fist-long beards and ankle-length trousers for men), by their modesty, and by 
their spirit of chivalrous brotherhood and solidarity (pp. 16-17). 
After having devoted a paragraph to Yusuf’s denunciations of Shiism (“the 
Rāfiḍī Imāmī Zoroastrians,” p. 15), the book proceeds to detailing “the main 
13  For an extensive collection of fatwas by Quietist Salafi scholars disallowing democracy and elections, see Al-Kashmeeree S, Sheikh 
Muqbil’s Speech on Voting, Elections and Democracy, undated (available at http://www.salafitalk. net/st/uploads/Muqbil_Elec-
tions.pdf, accessed 1.8.2018). For a brief analysis of the (unintended) impact of these fatwas on the Nigerian arena, see Brigaglia, 
The Volatility of Salafi Political Theology, pp. 186-192.
14  Pp. 14-15, quoting from an undated lecture by Muhammad Yusuf in explanation of the Ṣaḥīh of al-Bukhārī.
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things the Community fought.” In line with Salafi methodology, the object of Yu-
suf’s denunciations were, first and foremost, bid‘a (heretical innovation) in all its 
forms, starting from Sufism and specifically, the Tijaniyya, which remains the 
most widely practiced Sufi order in Borno as in the rest of northern Nigeria. But 
even as important, if not more important, as a target were, for Yusuf, “the shirk 
(polytheism) of democracy and of the foreign colonial school system (boko),” 
as well as “working within the kufr (un-Islamic) system” (p. 18). It is because of 
Yusuf’s views on the prohibition of foreign schools, that the ‘ulamā’ al-sū’ (the 
“scholars of evil,” another reference to the Izala-aligned Salafis) started to call 
the new, rival Salafi community with the derogatory nickname of “Boko Haram.” 
As harsh as his condemnation of the western school system was, however, Yusuf 
was not of the advice that the mere fact of attending schools constituted ipso 
facto unbelief (p. 19), and he never called for a takfīr (excommunication) of the 
schoolchildren and their parents as such. His view was that certain points of bi-
ology and natural sciences (in particular, evolution and the hydrological cycle) 
went clearly against the Quranic verses. At the same time, he also had reserva-
tions about the spherical form of the Earth and about its rotation around the 
Sun, which, however, are “points around which there is difference of opinion 
(ijtihād) among scholars” (p. 20).15
The following pages (21-23) detail the actions taken by the Izala-aligned 
Salafi scholars of Nigeria, whose “sources of income depend on the apostate 
rulers (al-salāṭīn al-murtaddīn),” to antagonise Yusuf and his community: from ac-
cusations of “following the Kharijite methodology,” to various efforts to defend 
the legitimacy of the Nigerian establishment by “blustering about the necessity 
of obeying them and of taking permission for declaring Jihad only from them” 
(p. 21). Here, the authors make a direct reference to Isa Ali Pantami, a S a l a f i 
scholar whose public critical engagements (in Hausa) with Yusuf are still availa-
ble on the internet16 and have also been closely examined in the academic litera-
ture.17 The Izala scholars started to spy on Yusuf and to engage in “useless public 
debates,” during which they carefully avoided touching on the central points of 
doctrine, deceiving instead their public with “speeches and futilities that would 
burden heavy volumes by mentioning, and that it would be painstaking to even 
enumerate” (p. 22).
The opposition of the Izala-aligned Salafis gradually turned—continues the 
text without, however, providing a specific date—into repression. It is thanks 
to the collaboration of the “scholars of evil” with the Nigerian State, in fact, that 
15  Here, the authors seem to be attempting to exonerate their father from the belief that the Earth is flat (famously held by promi-
nent Salafi scholar Bin Baz) and to align him with the position of the theologian of the Islamic State, Abū Mālik al-Tamīmī, who 
accepts that the Earth is spherical (see “Slicing Off the Tumour,” p. 20, fn 1).
16  See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESOFrCdum9Q (accessed 1.8.2018), and, for the following parts, the links suggested by 
Youtube.
17  Anonymous, The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-radicalism in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram, 
Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2010, pp. 118-144.
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Yusuf was briefly arrested on two occasions: once, on the accusation of being 
associated with al-Qaeda; and on another occasion, accused of links with the 
“Talibans of Kanamma, [an organisation] headed by a man by the name of Mu-
hammad Ali and which was later responsible for the killing of Ja‘far Mahmud 
Adam, the idol (ṭāghūt) of the Murjiites” (p. 23). This, even though the Kanamma 
community had earlier “made takfīr (excommunication) of the Shaykh [Muham-
mad Yusuf] and attempted his assassination.”
Let us pause for a minute, for in the engagements and confrontations be-
tween these three men (Muhammad Yusuf, Ja‘far Mahmud Adam and Muham-
mad Ali) lies an important key to understand the early development of global 
and local Jihad in northern Nigeria. Yusuf has often been believed to be respon-
sible for the 2007 assassination of Ja‘far M. Adam,18 but the authors of “Slicing off 
the Tumour” exonerate him, shifting the blame to Ali and disassociating Yusuf 
from the latter. Today, we also know that Ali is considered by those, of the Nige-
rian Jihadis, who maintained an organic link to Al-Qaeda, as the man who acted 
(or rather, tried to act) as a liaison between Osama Bin Laden and the Nigerian 
arena in the late 1990s and early 2000s, only to be later betrayed by a mysterious 
“Shaykh Abu al-Bara’ al-Dourawi” (a religious scholar who, like Adam, originated 
from Daura).19 If the myth that the Kanamma camp was “a pacific commune” has 
been dispelled by the Al-Risala article cited at note 17 and mentioning Ali and al-
Dourawi, the hypothesis that the 2003 confrontation with the Nigerian security 
was not the incidental outcome of a dispute over fishing rights, but an under-
cover anti-terror operation, should now start to be seriously taken into consid-
eration. And although the embryonic Jihadi community led by Ali had not been 
able to establish a training camp at Kanamma as I had previously hypothesised, 
this was obviously their intention, which was averted thanks to the collabora-
tion of the top leadership of the Salafi community with the security. The text 
of “Slicing off the Tumour,” where Ali is presented as more extreme than Yusuf 
even if the latter had already clearly “made his Jihadi call,” should be seen as 
an additional evidence pointing to the fact that the Kanamma group was never 
established as a pacific commune but as a group linked (loosely or organically, 
it can be disputed) to Al-Qaeda. The Al-Qaeda linked Nigerian source cited in 
Al-Risala also believes that Adam was responsible for the assassination of Ali in 
early 2004,20 which could make sense in the light of Adam’s collaboration with 
the authorities. The possibility that the remnants of Ali’s “Talebans,” three years 
later, killed Adam in retaliation for the assassination of their leader, would there-
fore be realistic. The full picture of these events remains unclear (especially with 
18  Brigaglia Andrea, A Contribution to the History of the Wahhābī Da‘wa in West Africa: The Career and the Murder of Shaykh Ja‘far 
Mahmoud Adam (Daura, ca. 1961/1962, Kano, 2007), Islamic Africa, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012, p. 22; Thurston, Boko Haram, p. 99. 
19  Message from Nigeria, Al Risalah Magazine, 4, 2017 (available at: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/alrisacc84lah-
magazine-4.pdf, accessed 1.8.2018), p. 19.
20  Ibid.
208 ИЗМЕЂУ ФЕНОМЕНА И ПОКРЕТА: БОКО ХАРАМ, ЏИХАДИСТИЧКИ ПОБУЊЕНИЦИ У НИГЕРИЈИ 21. ВЕКА
ПОЛИТИКОЛОГИЈА РЕЛИГИЈЕ бр. 2/2018 год XII• POLITICS AND RELIGION • POLITOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS • Nº 2/2018 Vol. XII
reference to the relationship between Ali and Yusuf, which the Al-Qaeda source 
claims to have been organic, while the authors of “Slicing off the Tumour” claim 
to have been conflictual), but the fact that two documents recently released by 
Nigerian actors linked to global Jihadi groups make both reference to the in-
trigue of Kanamma, are further indications that the latter had a central role in 
creating the foundations for the “Boko Haram phenomenon.”
The text then moves to providing rich and interesting details of the steps 
taken by Yusuf, while facing a multiplicity of enemies, to build the structure of his 
organisation. Yusuf’s was a long-term strategy aimed at building, coordinating 
and motivating a vast Jihadi community from inside, and as a part of its surround-
ing, mainstream Muslim environment—not at rushing to strike its enemies or 
at isolating itself as the men of Muhammad Ali had foolishly done in Kanamma. 
The visibility of Yusuf and his community was the talisman that made its Jihadi 
project invisible and therefore, much more dangerous than that of its Kanamma 
predecessors. The structure built by Yusuf comprised a Majlis al-shūrā, a core ex-
ecutive composed of nine religious scholars; a number of regional committees; 
a supervision committee; a ḥisba (public morality) committee; a finance commit-
tee (from the information included under this heading, we can conclude that 
Yusuf was not relying on foreign funders); a security (concerned—it is important 
to note—especially with preventing the members of the organisation from com-
mitting any act that would attract the suspicion of the Nigerian security); a com-
mittee of beneficence; a media committee (concerned with the publication of 
the group’s audio and video recordings); and a military committee which “in the 
public, limited itself to ensuring the security of the Shaykhs and the protection 
of the centres, while secretly, it trained in the use of arms and explosives” (p. 25).
The Confrontation: 2009
Notwithstanding the efforts made by Yusuf to keep the military training 
of its members secret, this must not have passed unobserved to the Nigerian 
security, which was obviously keeping Yusuf under close surveillance after his 
January 2005 negotiated return from Saudi Arabia. Gradually, in coordination 
with the “barking dogs” (p. 26; again a reference to the Izala-aligned Salafi schol-
ars) and in particular, Ja‘far Mahmud Adam (referred, once again, as the ṭāghūṭ, 
here intended as “idol,” of the non-Jihadi Salafis) and one Bashir Kashirra, the 
security decided to take a definitive measure towards the physical elimination 
of the group. Prevented from praying in the Izala mosques of Kano and of other 
cities, the members of Yusuf’s group were exposed to the unleashing of “Op-
eration Flush Out” (p. 27), launched by the Borno State Government with the 
purported aim of crushing armed robbery, but perceived (probably rightly) by 
the authors of “Slicing off the Tumour” as a new cover-up (after the Kanamma 
“fishing rights” story) for an anti-terror operation, this time directed at the group 
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that Yusuf had painstakingly re-organised. The repression escalated during the 
year 2009, culminating in the famous incident of the shooting of four members 
of the group, on the 10th of June, while they were returning from a funeral. This 
resulted, as is well known in the literature, in the issuing of Muhammad Yusuf’s 
“Open Letter” to the Nigerian government (p. 28), and in his decision, under the 
pressure of the circumstances, to call his followers to military action even while 
knowing that he would face certain martyrdom. 
Pp. 29-34 contain a lot of information—presented, obviously, in a hagio-
graphic style—on the military confrontations that occurred between the end 
of July and the beginning of August 2009. This account confirms the outline of 
the unfolding of the events provided in the many published reports and books 
but adds some interesting details. Yusuf had appointed one man, Abu ‘Amir 
al-Barnawi, as the general in-chief of an army of mujāhidīn which was—if we 
believe this account—remarkably big. Under Abu ‘Amir, in fact, were three com-
manders, each in charge of 1,000 men (p. 29). This militia, however, was poorly 
armed. Although Yusuf called his followers to sell all their possessions and buy 
as many weapons as possible, the “Kalashnikovs, revolvers and ammunitions” 
previously gathered by the group were intercepted by the Nigerian security.21 
As a result, when on 2 Sha‘bān 1430 (24 July 2009), Yusuf arranged his forces for 
the defence of the Markaz Ibn Taymiyya in Maiduguri, he could only rely on one 
Kalashnikov per unit of twenty-thirty men (p. 30), while the rest had to rely on 
“swords, bows and arrows.” 
While the Markaz was surrounded by the Nigerian police waiting to take 
action, the mujāhidīn grouped in Maiduguri were receiving news of the attacks 
by the police forces to the group’s headquarters in Bauchi State, and of the re-
sponse of Yusuf’s men, who were able to raid a police station in Dutsen Tanshi. 
As they were poorly armed, however, the “brothers in Bauchi” had been even-
tually overcome and arrested. On the morning of Saturday 3 Sha‘bān, on the 
contrary (and while the Markaz in Maiduguri was still surrounded by the Borno 
State police), Yusuf’s forces in Yobe State had been able to score two victories 
in the battles of Damaturu and Potiskum, raiding a huge quantity of weapons 
from several police stations. However, as they had not been previously trained 
to the use of firearms, the “brothers in Yobe” had eventually dispersed, leaving 
the arsenal in the hands of the security, which had subsequently raided the two 
headquarters.
On the evening of Saturday, the Nigerian police had finally received orders 
to attack the Markaz in Maiduguri, and a fierce battle had taken place, during 
which the 3,000-men strong militia of Yusuf had been able to repel the attack. 
During the following three days, Yusuf’s men were able to retaliate by raiding 
21  Most likely a reference to the “Boko Haram training camp in Biu” discovered by the Nigerian security in mid-July 2009 (“INTER-
VIEW–Nigerian Sect Planned Bomb Attack During Ramadan,” Reuters, 4 August 2009; https://af.reuters.com/ article/nigeriaNews/
idAFL438570820090804, accessed 1.8.2018).
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several police stations, confiscating numerous weapons and killing many police-
men. Finally, however, on Wednesday 7 Sha‘bān 1430 (29 July, 2009), the spe-
cial units deployed by the Nigerian military under the order of President Umaru 
Musa Yar’Adua, had arrived in Maiduguri and unleashed a new, more powerful 
attack on the Markaz. The authors provide some details of the heroic resistance 
of the members of the group, naming some of the leaders who were “martyred” 
on the occasion, like Abu ‘Amir al-Barnawi, Dr Abu Adam Adamawa (probably a 
University lecturer), Abdallah Maiduguri and Muhammad Kashari. Before being 
finally arrested on Thursday, 30 July 2009, Yusuf, knowing he was facing death, 
ordered his remaining forces to flee and to wait for an opportunity to reorganise 
themselves. The section ends with the quote of some Arabic verses from an el-
egy dedicated to Yusuf, composed by “Shaykh Abū ‘Abdallāh Usāma” (p. 33).
Abubakar Shekau, the “Tumour”
The following section of Chapter One narrates the successive developments 
of the Nigerian Jihadi community after the death of Yusuf, providing some 
scanty biographical details on Abu Bakr Shekau, and a much more interesting 
account of the splits that occurred within the movement after his succession to 
the leadership.
Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad Shekau came from a harsh rural environment, which 
left “a bad mark on his soul, giving him the negative behavioural traits of the 
Bedouins, such as rudeness, avarice and quarrelsomeness” (p. 35). Shekau had 
left his original environment as a child and travelled to Maiduguri in search of 
Islamic knowledge. After studying for some time in the “High Islam Institute,” an 
institution run by Tijani Sufis, he left it before completing his studies when he 
made his first encounters with the Salafi scholars, from whom he received a 
“superficial knowledge” of the Salafi canon. When Yusuf started his preaching, 
Shekau enthusiastically followed him, becoming one of his closest disciples. And 
when Yusuf started to put Shekau in charge of some teaching, people—con-
tinue the authors of “Slicing off the Tumour”—were attracted by the simple, yet 
passionate and motivating style of his lectures, which they attended not only as 
a learning exercise, but also as a form of “amusement and entertaining” (p. 36). 
At the same time, however, Shekau was also known and respected for his virtues 
of piety and asceticism: he used to wear simple, unembroidered clothes; he used 
to eat a porridge of coarsely ground millet as a meal; and he used to ride a simple 
motorcycle, refusing the offer of some members of the group to buy him a car. 
It was because of these praiseworthy traits, that Yusuf had “elevated him above 
all other preachers, had drawn him close, and had started to appoint him as his 
deputy whenever he would travel” (p. 36). 
In re-organising the scattered community of Yusuf’s Jihadists after the 2009 
crackdown, Shekau had also given the organisation, for the first time, the name 
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of Jamā‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihād (Community of the People of the 
Sunna for Preaching and Jihad). Shekau’s original input on the Nigerian Jihadi 
community was, overall, a positive one from the point of view of the group: it 
was thanks to him, in fact, that the dispersed and demoralised followers of Yusuf 
were able to regroup, and it was thanks to his video-messages that they were 
spurred once again into action. It is also under his leadership that a delegation 
travelled to the Algerian Sahara to meet the leaders of AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Is-
lamic Maghreb), with whom they “arranged ways of communicating, entertain-
ing a strong connection for some time in the form of reciprocal visits of delega-
tions and letter exchanges” (p. 37). Thanks to the logistic support of the Saharan 
partners, “tens of raids and martyrdom operations were carried out, targeting 
the churches of the militant Christians, who so many a time had given to the 
Muslims the taste of distress and bitterness.”
The narration of the predicament into which the Nigerian Jihadis sank dur-
ing the following years because of Shekau’s extremism, largely overlaps with the 
one provided by AQIM in “Some Advice and Guidelines.” However, as “Slicing 
off the Tumour” provides additional insights, it is worth summarising this sec-
tion in some detail. The excessive extremism of Shekau, as well as his “autocratic 
and selfish” leadership style, were soon noticed, both at the national and global 
levels of the Jihadi leadership. This had prompted AQIM to release a letter of ad-
vice, at the result of which the Nigerian Jihadi community split into three groups: 
one in defence of Shekau; one still committed to Jihad but opposed to him; and 
a third which, disenchanted, fell into the “opposing extremism” of renouncing 
Jihad and joining “the Murjiites” (p. 38), i.e. the non-Jihadi Salafis. Shekau’s reac-
tion to the growing opposition of the “defectors” was brutal: not only, in fact, he 
attacked those who opposed him, but he killed even the few who, in the interest 
of the organisation, attempted to remain neutral and to mediate between the 
two groups. Among the representatives of the “middle way” between Shekau’s 
“extremism” and his “moderate-Jihadi” opposition, were the two commanders 
Abu Sa’ad Bama and Muhammad Salafi, who chose to remain under him but 
tried to use their influence to moderate his views. For some time, the above-
named were among the very few in the organisation who were personally in 
touch with Shekau, for the latter had started conducting a strictly secretive life. 
Before being “martyred” (the text does not explicitly say whether they were 
killed by Shekau, but it implies it), the two were accused by Shekau of treason 
for having used their influence with the leader to cut off the ties between him 
and his army of mujāhidīn, thus undermining his authority.
When Shekau started confiscating the weapons of the commanders who 
refused to submit to his authority, the Jihadis who were opposed to his leader-
ship finally broke off from him and, with the blessing of AQIM, established an 
independent organisation, named Anṣār al-Muslimīn fī Bilād al-Sūdān (The Van-
guard of the Muslims in the Lands of the Blacks). Ansaru (as the organisation be-
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came known) was originally led by Abu Muhammad Bauchi and included “some 
of the leading poets of the community, like Shaykh Abū Usāma al-Anṣārī and 
Muḥammad Awwal Gombe.” Members of Ansaru too, however, were soon en-
gulfed in an internal debate around whether or not the Muslim masses who are 
unaware of the fact that collaborating with the Nigerian government constitutes 
unbelief, should be excused (al-‘udhr bi-l-jahl) and should therefore be spared by 
the Jihadists’ attacks. This debate led to a further fragmentation of the leader-
ship of Ansaru and to its ultimate decline (p. 39). On the whole, the authors of 
“Slicing off the Tumour” continue, the members of Ansaru were more learned 
than Shekau, but the latter had control of the mujāhidīn’s army, a fact that en-
sured his success. Shekau’s men were thus able to kill Abu Usama al-Ansari,22 
who had inherited the leadership of Ansaru after the arrest of Abu Muhammad 
Bauchi. The rest of the Ansaru leadership, which was “influenced by the thought 
of al-Qaeda” (p. 39), was decimated by the arrests made by the Nigerian police, 
while the lay members of the group, from that time on, restricted their opera-
tions to the robbing of banks and to the kidnapping of foreigners for ransom.
As Shekau’s camp was now “deserted from scholars and seekers of knowl-
edge,” it provided fertile grounds for the emergence of all sorts of extremism by 
its lay members. These included the practice of highway robberies directed at 
the Muslim commoners, whose loot was considered as legitimate booty of war 
based on Shekau’s blanket excommunication of the Muslim masses. Gradually, 
some of the lay followers of Shekau were able to occupy an entire neighbour-
hood in the east of Maiduguri, close to the train station, which they used as a 
basis to engage in systematic raids on the residents of Maiduguri, thus further 
contributing to the alienation of the Muslim masses from the Jihadis. Exasper-
ated by the actions of Shekau’s men, the Muslim residents of Borno decided to 
actively collaborate with the Nigerian government in the fight against the Jihad-
is through the establishment of the Civilian Joint Task Force (‘yan kato da gora). 
The opposition of the Muslim residents of Maiduguri forced the Jihadis, af-
ter three years of Jihad and after the death or the arrest of all the commanders 
who had been directly appointed by Yusuf, to move out of town and to look 
for refuge in the forest of Sambisa (p. 41). This was the occasion for Shekau to 
“openly transform the methods of the organisation, changing the rules it had 
been established upon, in broad daylight, into his vulgar Kharijite doctrines.” As 
the author of the introduction of “Some Advice and Guidelines,” the authors of 
“Slicing off the Tumour,” too, accuse Shekau of systematically killing the scholars 
of the group, and name Shaykh ‘Abd al-Malik Kaduna and Shaykh Abū al-‘Abbās 
Binkuwa as examples. This went on, the authors continue, until the June 2014 
announcement of the Islamic State’s world Caliphate by Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī 
in Mosul, Iraq.
22  Abu Usama al-Ansari should be the nom de guerre of Khalid al-Barnawi. However, Khalid al-Barnawi was arrested, not killed, in 
2016.
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Chapter 2, the longest in the book, interrupts the historical account with 
a long (pp. 50-95) and repetitive theological treatise aimed at demonstrating 
that Shekau should be considered as a Kharijite and that it is legitimate, if not 
obligatory, to fight him. Starting from the year 1435 (begun in November 2013), 
“Shekau had turned the mouth of his gun towards the Muslims, killing them and 
taking their children as captives. From that year on, Shekau would ambush the 
gathering places where he knew he would find the monotheists—like the sta-
tions, the mosques of the Sunnis and of other groups, the Eid prayer grounds—
and send a suicide attacker to blow himself off in the gathering” (p. 51), while 
at the same time keeping the “crusaders” safe from any harm. After that time, 
in fact, the Nigerian Christians, who over the previous years had been the main 
targets of the operations carried out by the AQIM-aligned Jihadis, were able to 
“celebrate their festivities in their churches, in safety and tranquillity,” protected 
by the security measures of the government, while the Muslims remained ex-
posed to the violence of Shekau’s group (p. 52).
Shekau thought of himself as a religious scholar and Jihadi leader of global 
repute, boasting to have inspired the Islamic State to the revival of slavery and 
the enslavement of the Yazidis with his famous mass kidnapping in Chibok (p. 
57). However, he kept committing banal linguistic mistakes in his lectures (p. 56) 
and giving improvised fatwas where he confused the ruling of jurisprudence on 
as ordinary a matter as divorce (p. 60). The combination of conceit and superfi-
cial knowledge of the canon was, for the authors of “Slicing off the Tumour,” the 
root of Shekau’s most central doctrinal mistakes in the application of the rules of 
takfir (excommunication):
(1) Failing to consider ignorance as an excuse (‘adam al-‘udhr bil-jahl), and 
therefore, teaching that any Muslim holding a Nigerian ID is an unbeliever, for 
his lack of disassociation (barā’a) from a kufr system.
(2) Adopting an extreme version of the takfīr musalsal (serial takfīr), based 
on the principle (particularly dear to the Salafi school, but not necessarily unique 
to it in the history of Sunni thought) that “whoever does not hold an unbeliever 
to be an unbeliever, or doubts about his status as an unbeliever, is an unbeliever 
himself.” As an example, the author quotes a tragicomic statement by Shekau 
according to which, “whoever commits an act of unbelief is an unbeliever and 
he is not excused even for an instant. […] And if you are of the opinion that I am 
being too strict in this, you are an unbeliever too. And whoever doubts of your 
status as an unbeliever, is an unbeliever himself, and who, and who and who 
etc… all unbelievers!” (p. 91).
The theological section of the book does not need a detailed analysis. Suf-
fice it to say that in framing Shekau as a Kharijite, the authors of “Slicing off the 
Tumour” rely on the canon of the Islamic State, that is the classical corpus of 
Salafi theology interpreted through the commentaries of Abū Mālik al-Tamīmī.
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The Dawla Issue
Much more interesting are, on the contrary, the third and fourth chapters 
of the book, which provide once again, useful and new (though not necessarily 
unbiased) historical information. First, the authors recapitulate (pp. 97-103) the 
“fruits” of Shekau’s extremist doctrine: destroying life in the Nigerian northeast; 
killing Sunnis; assassinating the scholarly leadership of the Jihadi community; 
distorting the original teachings of Muhammad Yusuf. In doing so, they give (us-
ing the word irhābī, “terrorist,” to describe Shekau’s actions…) an account of a 
massacre occurred in Madagali (Adamawa State), which as far as I am aware, had 
not been documented in such a proportion by the Nigerian news. After having 
captured the town (August 2014), Shekau’s men, in anticipation of a forthcom-
ing effort of the military to seize it from them, asked the inhabitants to choose 
between joining the Jihadists in the mountains or staying. After only 250 youth 
volunteered to join Shekau, the latter ordered the killing of all the rest, and more 
than 400 were executed (p. 103).
Then, the authors provide an extremely interesting account of the events 
that immediately preceded and followed Shekau’s famous pledge of allegiance 
(bay‘a) to the Caliphate of al-Baghdādī (March 2015). According to the authors, 
in fact, the June 2014 declaration of the Caliphate by the Islamic State had been 
welcomed by the commanders of Shekau’s group who had been patiently tol-
erating his leadership, for they had seen in the emergence of a new worldwide 
Jihadi leadership an occasion to moderate the extremism of the Nigerian Jihadi 
autocrat (p. 104). Shekau, on the contrary, not only had done all he could to re-
sist or postpone the pledge, but he had even killed many of those who were 
advising him to do so. Only after some time, as the pressure had become too 
strong, he had reluctantly ceded to it and publicly announced his allegiance. Im-
mediately thereafter, however, he had started once again to murder those who 
had pressurised him in that sense—while keeping their murders secret to the 
lay members or justifying their executions based on counterfeited accusations 
of high treason. The motive of all these murders was, for the authors, directly 
linked to “the issue of the Dawla.” The names of these commanders and the cir-
cumstances of their assassinations are provided by the authors through pp. 105-
108. The first was Muṣṭafā Chad (killed in November/December 2014), a Chadian 
who was in charge of a contingent of 5,000 men and to the military operations of 
whom the authors credit up to 80% of the conquests previously made by Shek-
au’s group during its 2014 territorial expansion (p. 105). The murder of Muṣṭafā 
Chad was kept secret for almost a year. The second was ‘Alī Abū Anīsa Gombe 
(killed in April/May 2015), who had originally been appointed to replace Muṣṭafā 
Chad as the head of the contingent of men previously led by the latter (p. 106). 
The third was Abū Ḥanīfa (killed in September/October 2015), who was one of 
those who had started to invite the members of the group to raise the issue 
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of Shekau’s leadership to the Caliphate. The fourth was Malam ‘Umar (killed in 
October/November 2015), an associate of Abū Ḥanīfa who, after escaping a first 
attempt of assassination, had personally gone to Shekau in repentance but who 
had been, nonetheless, killed by the latter (p. 107).
The authors of the book—who, according to their own account, had spent 
three years of their lives (ca. 2013-2016) under Shekau’s leadership—kept look-
ing at all these developments in distress but in silence, motivated by their com-
mitment to the Sunni principle of absolute obedience to the legitimate ruler 
(ūlū al-amr): as Shekau had been recognised as an Emir by the Caliph—they 
reasoned—they would have committed a grave sin by rejecting his authority. 
Shekau spared their lives (perhaps in deference to the memory of their father) 
but put them under a severe surveillance and removed them from their position 
of trustees of the official communication between Shekau and the Caliphate, 
warning them from entertaining any type of contact with the Islamic State. Lat-
er, when the two expressed their desire of participating in global Jihad by trave-
ling to Libya, he prevented them from doing so (p. 107), as he had previously 
prevented the Al-Qaeda-linked members of his organisation from traveling to 
Somalia and Algeria.23 After deliberation with another commander (Abū Fāṭima), 
the two finally decided to secretly contact the Caliphate to raise their concerns, 
similarly to what other Nigerian “defectors” from Shekau had done, in 2012, with 
AQIM. And for a second time, the leadership of a global Jihadi organisation had 
“dumped” Shekau, appointing instead one of the two sons of Yusuf (Abū Muṣ‘ab 
al-Barnāwī) as the new Emir of the Islamic State – West Africa Province.
Finally liberated from the religious obligation to follow Shekau, the defec-
tors attempted to reorganise and re-motivate the Jihadi forces in the Nigerian 
territory. In doing so, the “Army of the Caliphate” occasionally came to clash mili-
tarily with Shekau’s group, as detailed through pp. 108-109. The fire exchanges 
between the two rival Jihadi militias took place on 27 July 2016 (in an unspeci-
fied location); a few days later, on the shores of Lake Chad; in August 2016, in 
Yobe State; on 10 September 2016 (in an unspecified location); on 2 October 
2016, in Kirinuwa (Borno State), on the shores of the Lake Chad.
The Shekau Tumour: A Tentative Aetiology 
Read alongside “Some Advice and Guidelines,” the text of “Slicing off the 
Tumour” imposes a first, important conclusion: Abu Bakr Shekau, the secretive, 
tyrannical, histrionic, bloodthirsty and seemingly all-powerful Jihadi warrior 
from Yobe State, has consciously and resolutely tried to cut off any link between 
the Nigerian and the global fronts of Jihad twice: in 2012 with Al-Qaeda, and in 
2016 with the Islamic State. These moves were dictated, according to the au-
23  See Brigaglia and Iocchi, “Some Advice and Guidelines,” p. 34.
216 ИЗМЕЂУ ФЕНОМЕНА И ПОКРЕТА: БОКО ХАРАМ, ЏИХАДИСТИЧКИ ПОБУЊЕНИЦИ У НИГЕРИЈИ 21. ВЕКА
ПОЛИТИКОЛОГИЈА РЕЛИГИЈЕ бр. 2/2018 год XII• POLITICS AND RELIGION • POLITOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS • Nº 2/2018 Vol. XII
thors of the two books, by a combination of Shekau’s extreme theology of takfīr, 
of his exaggerated ambitions and of his paranoid personality. The leverage pro-
vided by his iron-fist control over the army of mujāhidīn he came to lead after the 
demise of Yusuf, as well as over their weapons and their movements, has been 
critical to his success. If he did not receive any external support, one cannot but 
stand in awe in front of Shekau’s achievements as a leader who has been able 
to withstand a war not only against the armies of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and 
Niger supported by the United States, France and Russia, but also against Al-
Qaeda and the Islamic State.
The second reflection is that today, in the presence of three organisations 
operating in Nigeria in the name of Jihad (one, temporarily declined and almost 
inactive, linked to Al-Qaeda; one, undergoing a phase of reorganisation, linked 
to the Islamic State; and one, operating in isolation from, and in opposition to 
Global Jihad, led by Shekau), the term “Boko Haram” has become obsolete, un-
less we use it as referring to a phenomenon (Jihadist insurgencies in twenty-first 
century Nigeria) and not to a “movement” or a “sect.”
In the past (especially under the Goodluck Jonathan administration), the 
Nigerian government had complained about the reluctance of the US to share 
intelligence on “Boko Haram.”24 If we intend by the latter term the militias led 
by Shekau, Nigeria should not expect any substantial cooperation, at least in 
the short term: as it appears that Shekau is actively engaged in an effort to turn 
a Nigerian Jihadi network of potentially global reach into a local insurgency, in 
fact, there is no reason why eliminating him should constitute a priority of the 
US foreign policy—and the US are not necessarily to be blamed if this will be 
their choice. If the war of the US is a war on Global Jihad, in fact, Shekau’s insur-
gency is not their problem, but it might become an indirect leverage against the 
more dangerous (from their point of view) threats of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State. Nigeria can, on the contrary, expect a more proactive collaboration from 
the US in the fight against globally linked factions like Ansaru and Abū Muṣ‘ab 
al-Barnāwī’s group, as well as in the support to the State’s infrastructures and in 
the enhancement of good governance, which continue to be critical, and very 
welcome, types of support. However, the independence of the Nigerian state 
and more broadly, of the African states, in developing their own strategies of 
the “War on Terror” and in determining the priorities of their policies, will be 
critical to preserve. For there is no doubt that—as important as the local context 
of Borno is to understand the appeal of the message of Muhammad Yusuf first, 
and Abu Bakr Shekau later, to a local public, and their capacity to mobilise and 
coordinate their militias—Nigeria has been a front of Global Jihad and of the 
Global War on Terror for quite some time, probably since the early 2000s and 
24  “Chibok Schoolgirls: U.S. will not share military intelligence with Nigeria—Officials,” Premium Times, 14 May 2014 (https://
www.premiumtimesng.com/ news/160751-chibok-schoolgirls-u-s-will-share-militaryintelligence-nigeria-officials.html, accessed 
1.8.2018).
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the Kanamma intrigue.
So, who is to blame for the onset of this “tumour”—the agency of global 
actors or the structure of local Nigerian (and, Bornuan) society? The immune sys-
tem of Nigeria was obviously weak due to the systemic and structural problems 
that are perfectly summarised in the analysis provided in the first chapter of Alex 
Thurston’s recent book:25 endemic corruption; regionally unequal development; 
massive urbanisation; and unaddressed local religious crises—to which I would 
add a dysfunctional, ethnic-based Federalism which provides the rationale for 
low-scale ethnic cleansing of “non-indigene minorities” (especially in the Middle 
Belt) and inhibits the capacity of the Federal Government (of any political col-
our) to take repressive action in states controlled by the opposition (of any po-
litical colour). But the carcinogenic radiations to which this body was exposed, 
generating the disease, were global in nature from the very onset, and on this 
point, I stand closer to the views expressed by Jacob Zenn in his debate with 
Adam Higazi, Brandon Kendhammer, Kyari Mohammed, Marc-Antoine Pérouse 
de Montclos and Alex Thurston.
First, came the two combined radiations of Al-Qaeda’s Global Jihad rhetoric 
and of George W. Bush’s War on Terror rhetoric with their (empirically fallacious, 
but emotionally appealing) “either with us or against us” discourses. These dis-
courses created a vortex of reactions that instinctively pushed many in the Mus-
lim world to sympathise with Osama Bin Laden’s project, even if they were una-
ware of its deeper implications. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, this sympa-
thy in Nigeria might have occasionally been shared across the traditional Izala/
Sufi divide. But it was the Izala leadership who systematically tried to capitalise 
on these emotions, using them to reinforce its agitation for the full implementa-
tion of Sharia in the country, as they allowed to reframe the latter not only as a 
part of a local conflict between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, but also of a 
global hegemonic context where Muslims, after having been victimised, were 
starting to rise up. In the early 2000s (most likely in November 2002), a main-
stream preacher of Izala like Abubakar Gero (who is, alongside Kabiru Gombe, 
one of the two most popular—though not certainly most learned—preachers 
of the group) was addressing the audience of his yearly public Quranic exegesis, 
between bursts of Allahu Akbar!, with the following words:
Do you think that there is no Mullah Omar active today? They are just busy 
preparing, and we can guarantee that they are on their way coming. Do you 
think that Osama Bin Laden is not active, just because he is keeping quiet? They 
are just busy getting ready for action. As for us, we are only waiting on them 
to send us their registration forms, and we will register! We are all ready to join 
them, even if this means to lift our entire country up! We are only waiting on 
this very little thing. They say they are investigating whether there are terrorists, 
25  Thurston, Boko Haram, Chapter One, “The Lifeworld of Muhammad Yusuf”, pp. 34-82. 
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whether there are Al-Qaeda people; they say they suspect there might be some 
of them in Nigeria: well, here they are, it’s us! Are you looking for Al-Qaeda’s peo-
ple, and you think you do not know who they are? Here we are! Are you looking 
for the people of Al-Qaeda? For the men of Osama Bin Laden? For the members 
of the organisation of Mullah Omar? Here we are!26
The connection between a popular “mainstream Salafi” preacher like Gero 
and the Global Jihad of Al-Qaeda was perhaps, a purely emotional one. It was 
based on his very shallow, mythical and binary understanding of the complex 
politics of the Middle East from which Al-Qaeda had emerged—which was 
not too dissimilar from the perception that an average Evangelical preacher, in 
America, would have had of Bush’s war with “the Moslems.” While the voicing of 
emotions plays a fundamental role in religion and politics alike, however, emo-
tions are also often forced to sink back in the silence of the heart and to make 
room to realpolitik. Which is what happened when the third wave of global ra-
diations came to hit Nigeria, in the form of the Saudi version of the War on Ter-
ror. The latter forced Izala (just as other Salafi communities worldwide) to take a 
clear stand against Global Jihad and to sever its ties with the Kanamma commu-
nity first, and with Muhammad Yusuf later. Yusuf did not have (here lies my main 
disagreement with Thurston’s analysis) to gradually “smuggle jihadist thought 
into a Salafi community that had originally been oriented toward non-jihadist 
Salafism,”27 for Jihadist rhetoric was well represented in the Izala of the early 
2000s. Rather, he was pushed away from the Nigerian Salafi community when a 
multiplicity of trends and rhetorical registers that had overlapped before, were 
not allowed to co-exist anymore. 
In the process, three things happened. The first was that the Izala scholars, 
unable to justify to their public the sudden turn in the content of their preaches, 
had no choice but to remain silent for various years on Al-Qaeda and Jihad, and 
to focus most of their public engagements with Yusuf on a secondary aspect of 
their conflict with him, that is the ban on government education. This led to the 
popularisation of the nickname “Boko Haram” through the “speeches and futili-
ties” contained in years of “useless debates,” which further muddled the waters. 
During the years of Yusuf’s ascent to fame, Global Jihad was, to use a Hausa idi-
omatic expression, kadangaren bakin tulun Izala, “the lizard sitting on the mouth 
of Izala’s water-pot”:28 Izala could not directly hit it (for by openly speaking nega-
tively about Global Jihad, they would have “broken the water-pot,” that is, they 
26  Gero Abubakar, Tafsīr Sūrat al-Rūm, undated (but most likely from 2002) audio recording in Hausa. I am grateful to Shaykh S. 
(Damaturu, Nigeria), for making a copy of the recording available to me.
27  Thurston, Boko Haram, p. 109.
28  I am thankful to my wife, Fauziyya Fiji, for suggesting this metaphor, as well as for many other insights that helped me in in-
terpreting the universe of the Izala youth base in the early 2000s, to which she feels personally close. In particular, I owe her my 
deep (though not uncritical) respect for the figure of Shaykh Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, and my attempt to understand the tragic 
predicament in which he found himself in the mid-2000s, reflected in my several articles on the topic. The responsibility for any 
mistake in the interpretation of the relative data, however, remains solely mine.
BETWEEN A PHENOMENON AND MOVEMENT: BOKO HARAM, JIHADIST INSURGENCIES IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY NIGERIA 219
Andrea Brigaglia ,“SLICING OFF THE TUMOUR”: THE HISTORY OF GLOBAL JIHAD IN NIGERIA,
 AS NARRATED BY THE ISLAMIC STATE  • (pp 199-224)
would have compromised the credibility of their own organisation); but by not 
doing so, they allowed the “lizard” to keep drinking from the water and gradu-
ally spoil it.
The second, was that because of their sudden about-turn, the “counter-
radical discourses” of the Izala-aligned scholars, based on the defence of boko 
(modern education), appealed only to a section of its elder, urban middle-class 
public, who had invested so much in modern education and white-collar jobs, 
that it obviously had everything to lose from Yusuf’s programme. Such counter-
radical discourses were, on the contrary, utterly ineffective with a vast section of 
Izala’s broader base (the economically disenfranchised, but also the most ideal-
istic of the middle-class youth activists, who were often the sons or the students 
of Izala’s “counter-radical” elite). Some, in fact, from within this section of Izala’s 
base, understandably saw the about-turn of the leadership hypocritical, and de-
cided to side with Yusuf, whose preaching continued to bear the marks of Izala’s 
perceived “betrayal” of Jihad.
The third, and perhaps the most tragic consequence of the Saudi War on 
Terror played on Nigerian grounds, was that in its essence, the Saudi “anti-terror” 
policy was targeted not only at Al-Qaeda’s Jihad, but also at mainstream political 
Islam. Thus, in exporting it, the Saudis also exported their ultra-monarchic po-
litical theology, in the form of the political fatwas released by the most Quietist 
strand of Salafi thought in the Peninsula. These fatwas, by clearly disallowing 
elections, constitutionalism and democracy on religious reasons, unintended-
ly removed the ground beneath the feet of Nigeria’s “mainstream Salafis,” for 
whom participation in the country’s constitutional democracy was a key part 
of their strategy. Under the neat distinctions operated by the Islamised version 
of Bush’s “either with us or against us” paradigm promoted by the Saudi state 
after 9-11, in fact, there was no place for the political activism of the most gifted 
and independent scholars of the Salafi school in Nigeria, like Ja‘far M. Adam and 
Muhammad Awwal al-Albani. The domesticated “government ulamā’ ” of post-
2003 Izala had to navigate the contradiction of calling the Muslim masses to 
obedience to the leaders of a constitutional government that the Salafi canon, 
by virtual consensus, enjoined to withdraw from; but once navigating this con-
tradiction, they could survive and in fact, they could play a critical role in the 
government’s “de-radicalisation programmes.” Conversely, the Jihadi discourse 
of Yusuf, was suddenly ostracised, quickening the pace of its evolution into a 
full-fledged insurgency; yet, re-interpreted as a form of “Kharijism,” it still fitted 
the new paradigm of a “bad Islam” in opposition to the “good Islam” of the Saudi 
state. As for Adam, he initially followed the new guidelines, by abruptly cutting 
off his links with the NGO that had funded him for years, Al-Muntada al-Islami 
(originally founded by Muḥammad Surūr, who was not necessarily a Jihadi, but 
certainly a long-time Islamist opponent of the Saudi State) and by proactively 
and decisively cooperating with the Nigerian security, providing intelligence 
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and advice to counter Yusuf’s group. But although genuinely embracing an 
openly critical da‘wa against Yusuf’s Jihadi project, Adam also tried to remain 
as independent as possible from the Nigerian government, and was also clear-
ly sceptical of the “a-political Quietism” enjoined by the Saudi establishment. 
When he was killed by “the Kharijites” in 2007, he was de facto isolated (while 
at the same time outwardly iconised) in the global Salafi landscape. A similar 
destiny fell upon al-Albani, who would also be murdered seven years later. 
With popular and partially independent voices like those of Adam and Albani 
silenced, most of the Salafi public of northern Nigeria had to choose between 
embracing a form of ultra-Quietism that is so close to the Saudi establishment 
to appear as an indirect endorsement of the American Empire or sympathising 
with the Jihadis.
An underlying point of the recent debate around the global or local origin 
of “Boko Haram,” is that those who minimise the global roots of the phenom-
enon accuse the opposite camp of being instrumental to the most belligerent 
forms of American anti-terror engagement in Muslim-majority countries.29 On 
this point, it is my belief that Africa-based researchers should look at this aspect 
of the debate from the distance of external observers, without being drawn into 
what remains essentially an American conundrum. For we30 do not position our-
selves as privileged interlocutors of the American government, nor do we aim at 
influencing its foreign policy. Our critique of the devastating effects of the radia-
tions of the US War on Terror, therefore, should not prevent us from a parallel 
critique of the political theologies (in this case those of the Nigerian Salafi leader-
ship) which magnetically attracted another set of radiations, those of global Ji-
hadi-Salafism, unintendedly allowing them to target the Nigerian Muslim public 
without difficulty. And it is precisely because we are concerned about the effects 
of the tumour of takfīrī theologies in undermining the body of the Global South 
and its capacity to produce a stronger and healthier Muslim (as well as trans-re-
ligious) critique of the Global North, that we believe that Africa-based researchers 
should not refrain from documenting the global dimension of the “Boko Haram 
phenomenon.” In the context of internal US public discourses, the documenta-
tion of this dimension, and of the diffuse pro-al-Qaeda rhetoric of mainstream 
Nigerian Muslim scholars in the early 2000s, might be functional to nurturing 
the Islamophobic myths of the political Right and of its powerful lobbies. This 
is a problem inherent in American popular culture. But in our African Muslim 
context, the minimising attitude of Higazi et al does not serve the interests of an 
29  See Higazi et al, A Response to Jacob Zenn, pp. 203-204. Another underlying point of the debate is that Higazi et al argue that 
over-emphasising the agency of global Jihadi actors in the genesis of Boko Haram, feeds the out-dated model of a “Sufi-oriented 
African Islam” vs a “Salafi-oriented Arab Islam.” The same argument, however, could be turned against Higazi et al, for their failure 
to appreciate the depth of the participation of Nigerian actors into quintessentially global Jihadi networks, might also be seen as 
reinforcing the idea of an “African Islam” essentially isolated from or impermeable to global influences.
30  The research on which this paper relies is supported by the Centre for Contemporary Islam (CCI), University of Cape Town, South 
Africa.
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oppressed community. It only exonerates from their (more often indirect than 
direct) responsibilities, our religious elites who have been busy muddling the 
waters around the “Jihadist tumour” that they contributed to create, and that 
they later (genuinely, but ineffectively) tried to “slice off” from Nigeria.
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Андреа Бригагљи
„СЕЦКАЊЕ ТУМОРА“: ИСТОРИЈА ГЛОБАЛНОГ ЏИХАДА У 
НИГЕРИЈИ, ИЗ УГЛА ИСЛАМСКЕ ДРЖАВЕ
Сажетак
Овај рад нуди детаљан приказ и анализу текста „Сецкање тумора“, који 
су написали синови Мухамеда Јусуфа, оснивача нигеријског џихадистичког 
покрета Боко Харам, и који је недавно објављен од стране Исламске државе 
(2018). Аргумент овог текста се заснива на чињеници да ова књига, иако 
очигледно пристрасна, нуди важне увиде у историју џихада у Нигерији из 
угла самих актера која не сме бити занемарена. У закључку, аутор доводи у 
питање хеуристику корисности појма Боко Харам у литератури о локалним 
и глобалним манифестацијама џихада у савременој Нигерији. На крају, 
аутор смешта своју расправу у савремену дебату о природи глобалних 
веза које одржавају нигеријски џихадисти и како ове везе утичу на развој 
феномена Боко Харама.
Кључне речи: Боко Харам, Ал Каида, Исламска држава, глобални џихад, 
рат против терора
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